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 The article analyses the understanding on the rights of a legislator to 
pass legal norms with immediate effect. Although, up to now legal doctrine 
has viewed inadmissibility of retroactive legal norms more largely, in 
practice there are a lot more legal norms with immediate effect passed. 
Therefore the article firstly assesses features according to which legal norms 
related to past are passed with an immediate effect. Similarly, in light of the 
general view of case-law and legal doctrine that prima facie consider legal 
norms with immediate effect admissible and lawful, the article reveals the 
historical origin and development of this opinion. In addition, as the above 
assumption on admissibility of the legal norms with immediate effect is not 
absolute and is exposed to assessment of legitimate expectations of 
addressees of legal norms, a significant attention has been drawn to 
methodology of the admissibility assessment. Within the framework of 
analysis of methodology, the article views both different methods applicable 
for assessment of public interest and addressees of legal norms in cases of 
immediate effect as well as various circumstances that might be the basis to 
acknowledge legal norms with immediate effect as illegitimate. 
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Traditionally, only issues, that occur or are realized after the legal 
norms become effective, are subjected to binding nature of legal norms.2 
                                                          
2 Heukels T. Intertemporales Gemeinschaftsrecht. Rückwirkung, Sofortwirkung und 
Rechtsschutz in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990, p. 42–43.  
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Such effect of legal norms can be recognized, for example, if increased or 
new taxes are applied to transactions, which are realized after the legal 
norms become effective. Similarly in the future binding nature would exist 
if, for example, the new regulation would impact contractual relations 
planned to establish in the future or stricter construction requirements would 
apply to buildings that will be built in future. However, in practice there are 
situations when for purposes of the society interest it is necessary to direct 
the binding nature of legal norms to the past, thereby with retroactive or 
immediate effect impacting the issues that have occurred or might occur.  
In contrast to the comparatively large analysis of inadmissibility of 
retroactive effect3, researchers have assessed the legal situations that are 
related to legal norms with immediate effect less.4 Namely, admissibility of 
legal norms passed with immediate effect has been viewed mainly in the 
court rulings and in monographs, assessing it within the analysis of legal 
norms with retroactive effects.5 Consequently, such situation at first causes 
practical difficulties to legislator and furthermore to other appliers of legal 
norms to assess, whether and in which cases legal norms with immediate 
effect are admissible from the point of view of time. Moreover, unlike the 
conception of general inadmissibility of retroactivity in the state of law, there 
is a presumption that legal norms with immediate effect are generally 
considered legitimate.6 Therefore separation of these legal norms establishes 
                                                          
3 Onževs M. Retroactivity of legal norms and its restriction in a state of law. Sciences of 
Law for Future, 2. Journal of the University of Latvia, No. 4, 2013. 
4 Legal doctrine also expresses the opinion that assessment of legitimacy of the legal norms 
passed with immediate effect is one of the basic problems of correlation between law and 
effect in time. Heukels T. Die Rückwirkungsjudikatur des EuGH: Grundlagen und 
Tendenzen. Vortrag vor dem Europainstitut der Universität des Saarlandes Saarbrücken, den 
15. Januar, 1992. Europa-Institut Universität des Saarlandes, 1992, p. 42. 
5 See, for example, Berger T. Zulässigkeitsgrenzen der Rückwirkung von Gesetzen. Eine 
kritische Analyse der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und des Gerichtshofs 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Europäischer Verlag der 
Wissenschaften, 2002. 
6 „Eine unechte Rückwirkung ist verfassungsrechtlich grundsätzlich zulässig. Sie liegt vor, 
wenn eine Norm auf gegenwärtige, noch nicht abgeschlossene Sachverhalte und 
Rechtbeziehungen für die Zukunft einwirkt und damit zugleich die betroffene 
Rechtspositionen nachträglich entwertet.” (Translation: “Quasi retroactive effect (immediate 
effect – M.O.) fundamentally is considered legitimate. It is recognizable when legal norm 
affects the current not yet completed legal relations and legal relations with regards to future 
and therefore adversely change the legal position affected.”) Ruling No. 1 BvR 3076/08 of 
18 February 2009 by the First Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 122.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, 
p. 374–397 (p. 394). Götz V. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vertrauensschutz. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht und Grundgesetz. Festgabe aus Anlaß des 25jährigen Bestehens 




a fundamental basis for assessment of admissibility of legal norms related to 
the past from the point of view of time.  
In light of the above, the article provides an in-depth understanding 
of identifying legal norms with immediate effect along with assessment of 
admissibility of such legal norms in the state of law. The first part of the 
article views the identification and preconditions of legal norms with 
immediate effect as well as historical concept of separation of retroactive and 
immediate effect as the basis for restriction of legal norms with immediate 
effect. The second part of the article analyses methodological aspects to 
assess admissibility of legal norms with immediate effect. The final part of 
the article reveals conditions that might serve as the basis to recognize legal 
norms with immediate effect as illegitimate.   
 The main legal sources on the basis of which the analysis was carried 
out are the conclusions of the Continental Europe case-law and the concepts 
of the legal doctrine. Besides, as the main source of law in assessing the 
legitimacy of temporal restrictions of the legal norms is the case-law7, an in-
depth analysis of understanding and concepts developed within the German 
and Latvian case-law has been provided. It is of importance to emphasize 
that the German case-law is analysed as the main source of law of the 
Continental Europe to comprehend the restrictions of legal norms due to 
their temporal impact on legal relations occurred or commenced in the past. 
Analysis of the conclusions and rulings of the Latvian law is related to the 
author’s goal to apply the conclusions developed as a result of the article to 
improve the Latvian legal system. 
 
1. Conceptual understanding of legal norms passed with immediate 
effect 
 
1.1. Identification of legal norms passed with immediate effect 
In line with the legal doctrine8 and conception developed within the 
case-law9, legal norms are considered to be passed with immediate effect10 if 
they are applied to issues commenced in the past but continuing after the 
new regulation has come into effect. It has to be identified that legal 
regulation applies to issues which realization was commenced in the past, 
however, the legal regulation impacts those issues only in respect to the 
future. The above aspect – attributing the binding nature of a legal norm to 
                                                                                                                                                     
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Zweiter Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1976, 
p. 421–453. 
7 Schmidt W. „Vertrauensschutz” im öffentlichen Recht. Randpositionen des Eigentums im 
spätbürgerlichen Rechtsstaat. Juristische Schulung, September 1973, Heft 9, p. 529–537. 
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the future not past is the main feature that differ those from the legal norms 
with retroactive effect.11  
In light of the above, immediate effect can be often established both 
in regulating the public legal relations and passing amendments in the private 
sphere of law. For example, amendments to legal norms with an immediate 
effect may impact actions, performed within the taxation period, or change 
already assigned social benefits within the period of time after the legal 
norms have come into effect. Similarly, the immediate effect may implement 
changes in the private sphere of law. Therefore, modifying provisions of 
concluded loan agreements after the legal norm coming into effect, or 
adversely impacting the legal situation of lenders towards the established but 
not yet collected mortgages, will be passed with immediate effect. 
Illustrating legal norms passed with immediate effect, it should be noted that, 
for example, in 2009 in the German legal system there were amendments 
implemented in the insurance sphere applying the amendments also to 
insurance contracts concluded before.12 As it was indicated in the annotation 
to the legal regulation, assigning additional rights to the already insured 
persons and providing unfavourable regulations to the insurance merchants 
would impact the legal relations with the immediate effect.13   
                                                                                                                                                     
8 Götz V. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vertrauensschutz. Bundesverfassungsgericht und 
Grundgesetz. Festgabe aus Anlaß des 25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 
Zweiter Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1976, p. 421–453. 
9 Ruling No. 2 BvR 4/59 of 31 May 1960 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court 
of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 11.Band. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961, p. 139–149. 
10 The term “immediate effect” is replaced also with other terms. For example, initially in 
the German law “immediate effect” was called “quasi retroactive effect” (in German – 
unechte Rückwirkung). Onževs M. Par neīsta atpakaļejoša spēka izpratni Latvijas tiesu 
nolēmumos. Jurista Vārds, 26 March 2013, No. 12 (763). Later on, a term that can be used 
concurrently was implemented within the case-law: “past attachment of legal norms” (in 
German - tatbestandliche Rückanknüpfung). Ruling No. 23, 2 BvR 475/78 of 22 March 
1983 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 63.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1983, p. 343–380. 
11 Onževs M. Retroactivity of legal norms and its restriction in a state of law. Sciences of 
Law for Future, 2. Journal of the University of Latvia, No. 4, 2013. 
 
12 Neuhaus K.J., Kloth A., Köther L. Neue Frist, alte Verträge – Wann ist ein Altvertrag mit 
mehrjähriger Laufzeit kündbar. Zeitschrift für Versicherungswesen, 15.03.2009., p. 180–
183. 
13 Annotation of 20 December 2006 No. 16/3945 to the law On reforming the insurance 
contracts (“Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Versicherungsvertragsrechts”).  
Available: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/039/1603945.pdf [accessed on 10 April 
2013] 




Not always it is clear to legislator itself, whether legal norms related 
to legal relations realized or commenced in the past have been passed with 
immediate or retroactive effect. Therefore sometimes due to the fear to pass 
legal norms with retroactive effect, legislator may refuse to implement 
amendments to legal regulation that actually may be assigned as immediate 
effect. It should be noted that legislator of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter 
– the Saeima) is currently facing a significant challenge as it recently has 
passed amendments to the Civil Law on restriction of contractual penalty 
that have not come into effect yet.14 The goal of the amendments is to protect 
immediately the debtors of the existing legal relations, therefore it would be 
logical to apply restrictions of the amount of contractual penalty not only as 
regards the contracts to be concluded in the future but also legal relations the 
realization of which was commenced in the past – contract already 
concluded. However, as both the society and part of lawyers have an 
unreasonable opinion that attributing the amendments to contracts already 
concluded would mean the legal norms have been passed with a retroactive 
effect, it is planned to pass transitional provisions until the amendments 
come into effect. Consequently, new regulation of contractual penalty could 
be passed with a further effect only as regards the contracts concluded in the 
future. 
It shall be noted that due to similar arguments amendments to the 
Civil Procedure Law of the Republic of Latvia were refused previously. 
Namely, in light of the existing problems in the sphere of settlement of 
payments for public utilities, amendments to legal regulation with immediate 
effect were proposed implementing a primary collection of debts for public 
utilities at the real estate secured by a mortgage. However, on basis of 
arguments regarding protection of interests of mortgage creditors15 and 
considering risk of potential litigation at constitutional court due to 
                                                          
14 Amendments to the Civil Law of 20 June 2013. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 4 July 2013, No. 128 
(4934) (come into effect on 01.01.2014). 
15 “The planned amendments apply to procedural legal norms the amendments to which 
have an immediate effect. Although the amendments do not directly relate to liabilities 
between the lender and borrower (the main interest of whom is, on the one hand, to receive 
the loan, but, on the other hand – to receive repayment of the loan within the prescribed 
terms) as those relate to issues related to directing of collection to real estate, creditor’s 
interests to receive the claim from the collateral are impacted." Report on first impact 
assessment of the draft law “Amendments to the Civil Procedure Law” (annotation).  
Available: 
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS10/SaeimaLIVS10.nsf/0/7264CFBB80090237C225783E00314
570?OpenDocument#b [accessed on 10 August 2013] 
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retroactive effect16, Saeima without a convincing argumentation refused the 
initial implementation of amendments.  
According to the above, it should be taken into account that 
identification of degree of effect of a certain legal norm – whether it is 
passed with retroactive or immediate effect – is an important condition to 
assess it from the point of view of the time. In other words, passing legal 
norms related to the past, legislator should comprehend and assess to what 
extent the planned amendments to the legal regulation influence the legal 
relations established in the past. 
 
1.2. Historical development of admissibility of legal norms with 
immediate effect 
 As it was mentioned before, one of the main reasons to identify legal 
norms with immediate effect is the understanding of their prima facie 
legitimacy. Although legal norms passed with immediate effect are related to 
the past, they are, however, considered legitimate. Therefore, further on 
establishment and historical development of this concept has been viewed.  
 Since the Ancient Rome, legal norms related to past dimension were 
divided by intensity of their effect.17 However, until the second half of the 
20th century, legal norms related to the past were separated not to recognize 
whether legislator has violated its authority to create legal norms but to 
interpret the will of legislator18. Therefore legal norms were not separated 
more precisely – those that have been passed with retroactive and those with 
the immediate effect. On the contrary - on the basis of the principle on “non-
retroactivity” of legal norms (German - Nicht-Rückwirkung19) the following 
separation of legal norms was made: legal norms the binding nature of which 
on the one hand impacts the legal relations in the past, on the other hand – 
the legal relations occurred after passing the legal norms.20 Consequently all 
                                                          
16 During the review of amendments to the Civil Procedure Law the head of the Legal 
Commission of the Saeima Ilma Čepāne has noted: “There is a saying: The road to hell is 
paved with good intentions. I would paraphrase it and say: “I am afraid that we are paving 
road with good intentions to the Constitutional Court.” 17.03.2011. Transcript of the sitting 
of the 10th Saeima. Available: http://www.saeima.lv/lv/transcripts/view/49 [accessed on 10 
August 2013] 
17 Vonkilch A. Das Intertemporale Privatrecht. Übergangsfragen bei Gesetzes- und 
Rechtsprechungsänderungen im Privatrecht. Wien: Springer Verlag, 1999, p. 15–17. 
18 See: Heukels T. Intertemporales Gemeinschaftsrecht. Rückwirkung, Sofortwirkung und 
Rechtsschutz in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990, S. 50, Hess B. Intertemporales Privatrecht. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998, p. 13. 
19 Heukels T. Intertemporales Gemeinschaftsrecht. Rückwirkung, Sofortwirkung und 
Rechtsschutz in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990, p. 50. 
20 Ibid. 




legal norms with any relation to regulation of issues realized in past – both as 
regards the legal relations already realized and only related to past - were 
altogether named with a general term “retroactive effect”.21 
This relatively superficial concept of differentiation between legal 
norms by their temporal effect changed only after World War II, when a 
different understanding of necessity to identify retroactive effect developed 
in the Continental Europe as basis to restrict the legislator's actions. Namely, 
analysis of borders of temporal effects was not anymore related to the work 
of appliers of legal norms but with the assessment of legitimacy of legal 
norms passed by legislator. The legal doctrine emphasizes that control of 
legislator’s work for purposes of restricting retroactive effect was 
particularly implemented in Germany, therefore establishing control 
mechanisms to preventively avert the unfair laws implemented during the 
National Socialist regime.22 
Due to necessity to recognize whether legislator has not interfered in 
the past, at first legal norms with retroactive effect were separated as the 
most intensive degree of effect to the legal relations realized in the past. 
Understanding of legitimacy of such legal norms passed with immediate 
effect has formed assessing not admissibility of legal norms passed with 
immediate effect but as a counterargument to legal norms passed with 
retroactive effect. Moreover – legal norms passed with immediate effect 
initially were considered a “by-product” (in German – Abfallprodukt) to 
identify retroactivity.23 Namely, the key goal assessing legitimacy of legal 
norms related to past dimension, were to protect addressees of law from legal 
norms passed with retroactive effect. Whereas in other circumstances level 
of protection of addressees of legal norms was not considered important to 
implement special protection against legislator's interference with the past 
dimension24 and thereby ensure protection of legitimate expectations.  
                                                          
21 Maurer H. Kontinuitätsgewähr und Vertrauensschutz. Ins: Isensee J., Kirchhof P. 
Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band IV. Heidelberg: C.F.Müller Verlag, 2006, p. 404. Krons 
M. Study of Intertemporal law, Article 3 of the Civil Law. Tieslietu Ministrijas Vēstnesis, 
1938, No.1. p. 83-115. It is interesting to note that, for example, in the Anglo-Saxon law 
there is uncertainty related to terminology, namely, in which cases one can use the terms 
used in the Continental European law referring to retroactive and immediate binding nature: 
“retroactivity” and “retrospectivity”. Juratowitch B. Retroactivity and the Common Law. 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008, p.7–10. 
22 Götz V. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vertrauensschutz. Bundesverfassungsgericht und 
Grundgesetz. Festgabe aus Anlaß des 25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 
Zweiter Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1976, p. 421–453. 
23 Pieroth B. Rückwirkung und Übergangsrecht Verfassungsrechtiche Massstäbe für 
intertemporale Gesetzgebung. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1981, p. 60. 
24 Berger T. Zulässigkeitsgrenzen der Rückwirkung von Gesetzen. Eine kritische Analyse 
der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2002, p. 51. 
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Regardless of comparatively dogmatic attitude towards admissibility 
of legal relations realized or commenced, in a short period of time after 
separating retroactive and immediate effect gradually the understanding of 
protection of addressees of legal norms, if immediate effect has been 
recognized, was improved. For example, although, the case-law believes that 
without recognizing retroactive effect, legal norms from the point of view of 
time are considered legitimate25, the understanding was justified by 
assessment of violation of interests of addressees of legal norms.26 At the 
same time it should be noted that assessment of legitimacy of legal norms 
passed with immediate effect was performed not in line with the 
contemporary understanding but related only to subjective assessment of 
addressees of legal norms as regards reliance upon the changed legal 
regulation. Namely, assessing whether amendments to legal norms with 
immediate effect have been legitimate, it was important to clarify whether 
addressees of legal norms could take into consideration changes in regulation 
or during commencement of the operations anticipate the possible changes in 
the legal regulation.27 It was not, however, clarified how significant and 
urgent the amendments to protect the public interest are, opposing the 
respective amendments to confidence of addressees of legal norms that the 
legal norms shall be retained.  
Along with the initial understanding, based on which legal norms 
were only assessed from the point of view of addressees of legal norms, 
those legal norms passed with immediate effect were assessed from the point 
of view of time taking into account proportionality between interests of 
                                                          
25 Ruling No. 2 BvR 17/69 of 23 March 1971 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional 
Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 30.Band. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971, p. 392–406 (p. 402). Muckel S. Kriterien des 
verfassungsrechtlichen Vertrauensschutzes bei Gesetzesänderungen. Berlin: Duncer & 
Humblot, 1989, p. 68. 
26 „Der Bürger kann angesichts der Erfordernisse der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft nicht 
darauf vertrauen können, daß der zu Beginn eines Veranlagungszeitraums geltende 
Steuertarif bis zu dessen Ende unverändert bleibt. Wohl aber muß er darauf vertrauen 
können, daß sich eine Erhöhung des Steuertarifs während des Veranlagungszeitraums in 
maßvollen Grenzen hält.“ (Translation: “Due to provision of the public financial situation, 
inhabitants are not allowed to believe that rates established in the beginning of the taxation 
period will remain the same until the end of the taxation period. At the same time, they may 
trust that, when increasing tax rates, proportionality shall be observed.”) Ruling No. 2 BvR 
1/60 of 19 December 1961 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. 
Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 13.Band. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1963 p. 274–278 (p. 278). 
27 Ruling No. 1 Bvl 22/57 of 11 October 1962 by the First Senate of the Constitutional Court 
of Germany. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 14.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1963, p. 288–306 (297–298). 




addressees of legal norms and public interest. To conclude, whether 
legislator, interfering with the past dimension with immediate effect, has 
acted illegally, violation of legitimate expectations of addressees of legal 
norms shall be considered, opposing it to the general benefit (in German - 
das Wohl der Allgemeinheit)28 of the legal regulation or the legitimate goal.29 
Therefore, the extent of violation of interest of addressees of legal norms and 
the interest of legislator to interfere with the past dimension became the 
obligatory are preconditions, on basis of which the impact of immediate 
effect on the legal relations realized past is assessed. It shall be noted that 
this understanding became the dominating one not only when assessing 
immediate effect but also any violation of legitimate expectations. 
 
2. Methodology used to assess admissibility of legal norms passed with 
immediate effect  
As a result of the above analysis, to verify whether legal norms 
passed with immediate effect are legitimate, it is significant to assess 
whether legitimate expectations of addressees of legal norms have not been 
violated illegally. Therefore the article further on views two different 
methodologies, on basis of which it is clarified whether legal norms related 
to the past, however, no retroactive effect can be identified, are legitimate.  
 
2.1. Assessment of admissibility of legal norms passed with immediate 
effect on basis of evaluation of the public interest and interest of 
addressees of legal norms 
The first legal method implying restriction of legal norms passed with 
immediate effect results from the traditional assessment of legitimate 
expectations that was initially developed in the German law and later on 
transferred also to the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Latvia (hereinafter – Constitutional Court of Latvia).30 It is based on the 
                                                          
28 Ruling No. 1 BvR 7/62 of 16 October 1968 by the First Senate of the Constitutional Court 
of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 24.Band. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969, p. 220–235 (p. 231–232). 
29 „Das Vertrauen der Beschwerdeführer auf die Zusage in der Berufsvereinbarung muß 
gegenüber dem Interesse an der baldmöglichen Realisierung der legitimen Absichten des 
Gesetzgebers zurücktreten.” (Translation: “Legitimate expectations of complainant 
regarding the agreement of the sphere are of less significance than the interest to implement 
the legitimate goal.") Ruling No. 1 BvR 79, 278, 282/70 of 8 February 1977 by the First 
Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 43.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1977, p. 242–
291 (p. 287). 
30 Paragraph 25 of the judgement in the case No. 2009-08-01 of 26 November 2009 by the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia „Par 2009.gada 12.marta likuma "Grozījumi 
likumā "Par valsts pensijām"" 2.panta vārdu "valsts pensijas 2009. gadā pārskatītas netiek" 
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principle that legislator, as long as it attributes the legal consequences 
occurring in the future to the previously established legal relations, has to 
observe a reasonable balance assessing the necessity of amendments to legal 
regulation or significance of the public interest compared to reliance of 
addressees of legal norms on the previous legal regulation.31  
At the same time it is admitted that this legal method does not specify 
how the interests of addressees of legal norms and public interest shall be 
assessed and it is exposed to circumstances of each legal situation. Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (hereinafter - Constitutional Court of 
Germany) has noted that, comparing interests of addressees of legal norms 
and public interest, the court is entitled to assess whether legislator, assessing 
the significance of interference and urgency of legal regulation, has not 
exceeded the reasonable limit.32 Consequently this legal method does not 
provide a certain correlation between the significance of its goal to protect 
the public excuse, on the one hand, and circumstances ensuring reliance to 
addressees of legal norms that legal regulation shall not be changed, on the 
other hand.33 It is possible to assume that the above deficiencies of the 
methodology and comparatively superficial analysis is the basis that only in 
rare cases the assessment of admissibility of legal norms passed with 
immediate effect recognizes that violation of legitimate expectations of 
addressees of legal norms prevails the public interest.  
In line with the above methodology, i.e., assessing and opposing the 
interests of addressees of legal norms and goal of the legal regulation or 
public interest, Constitutional Court of of Latvia has assessed legitimacy of 
legal norms passed with immediate effect. As it has been indicated by the 
                                                                                                                                                     
atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 109.pantam“. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 27 
Novemeber 2009, No.187 (4173). 
31 Ruling No. 2 BvR 17/69 of 23 March 1971 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional 
Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 30.Band. Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971, p. 392–406 (p. 404). 
32 Ruling No. 1 BvR 79, 278, 282/70 of 8 February 1977 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 43.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1977, p. 242–
291 (p. 289). 
 „Nur wenn das Vertrauen auf die Fortgeltung der bestehenden Rechtslage den Vorrang 
verdient, ist die Regelung unzulässig” (Translation: “Only in case legitimate expectations as 
regards retaining further legal benefits are of greater importance, legal regulation is 
inadmissible.”) Ruling No. 2 BvR 9 /85 and 3/86 of 8 June 1988 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 78.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989, p. 249–
289 (p. 284). 
33 See, for example, ruling No. 1 BvR 3076/08 of 18 February 2009 by the First Senate of 
the Constitutional Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 
122.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, p. 374–397 (p. 395). 




Constitutional Court of Latvia, "to assess, whether legislative acts providing 
deviation of the rights entitled to a person complies with the principle of 
legitimate expectations, it shall be clarified 1) if a person has legitimate 
expectations as regards retaining or implementing certain rights and 2) if 
there is a reasonable balance between protection of legitimate expectations of 
a person and ensuring public interest".34 Therefore conclusion, whether 
legislator, changing the legal regulation, has observed a reasonable balance 
between reliance of a person and interests due to which the regulation has 
been changed, may be drawn after answering two questions. Namely, only 
after it has been clarified that addressees of legal norms not only have legal 
expectations as regards the respective rights but those are considered 
reasonable enough35, the interests of the addressees of legal norms shall be 
assessed in context of the public interest and then amendments to legal 
regulation may be implemented. 
Although conceptually the respective understanding of assessment of 
compliance with the principle of legitimate expectations is not wrong, it shall 
be noted that in the Latvian legal system the assessment of possible violation 
of the legitimate expectations methodologically even more resembles the 
understanding existent in the 1960s in the German legal system. According 
to this understanding legitimate expectations of addressees of legal norms 
were assessed without opposing it to the public interest, mainly assessing 
how significant expectations it might have caused to the addressees of legal 
norms. This conclusion is related to the fact that the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia is not using the respective legal method to oppose the interests of 
addressees of legal norms to the public interest, because already during 
analysis of legitimate expectations it often recognizes that expectations are 
not justified.36 Consequently public interest and interest of addressees of 
                                                          
34 Paragraph 10.1 of judgement in the case No. 2012-21-01 of 12 June by the Constitutional 
Court of Latvia „Par 2009. gada 12. marta likuma "Grozījumi Iekšlietu ministrijas sistēmas 
iestāžu un Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvaldes amatpersonu ar speciālajām dienesta pakāpēm 
dienesta gaitas likumā" 5.panta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 91.pantam”. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 14 June 2013, No.114 (4920).  
Judgement in the case No. 2010-02-01 of 19 June 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
"Par likuma "Par nodokļiem un nodevām" 16.panta 10.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 1. un 105.pantam". Latvijas Vēstnesis, 28 June 2010, No.100 (4292).  
35 Paragraph 22.2 of judgement in the case No. 2011-04-01 of 22 November 2011 by the 
Constitutional Court of Latvia „Par Maksātnespējas likuma 13.panta pirmās daļas 2.punkta, 
ciktāl tas attiecas uz personām, kuras savu darbību maksātnespējas procesa administratora 
amatā ir uzsākušas saskaņā ar likuma "Par uzņēmumu un uzņēmējsabiedrību maksātnespēju" 
13.panta prasību par augstāko izglītību ekonomikas, vadības vai finanšu jomā, un 
Maksātnespējas likuma pārejas noteikumu 7.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 1., 91. un 106.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 24 November 2011, No.185 (4583). 
36 “Applicants could trust into the fact that the legislator would ensure them with the 
possibility of early retirement up to 31 December 2011, however, legitimate trust into the 
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legal norms are assessed not in all cases but only if reliance of addressees of 
legal norms on the norm under dispute is legitimate, justified and reasonable 
and legal regulation itself is certain and unchangeable enough to be trusted 
upon.37  
2.2. Assessment of legal norms passed with immediate effect on basis of 
proportionality test 
The other legal method to assess legitimacy of legal norms passed 
with immediate effect resembles the understanding described previously, 
however, it identifies more precisely how to recognize the possible violation 
of the legitimate expectations. To recognize legal norms passed with 
immediate effect to be legitimate the following three aspect have to be 
complied with: (1) legal regulation shall be appropriate to reach the planned 
goal; (2) legal regulation is necessary, i.e., there are no means that are less 
restricting from the point of view of time applying which the goal may be 
reached; and (3) as a result of assessment of the violated expectations of 
addressees of legal norms it can be concluded that reasonable there is no 
imbalance caused between the interests under assessment.38  
In light of the above, it was concluded that legal norms passed with 
immediate effect are assessed on basis of proportionality test that is 
traditionally used for other purposes – to assess the conceptual aspect rather 
than temporal aspect of legal norms.39 Moreover, applying the respective 
                                                                                                                                                     
amount of the early old-age pension to be disbursed could not result thereby.” Paragraph 23 
of judgement in the case No. 2010-29-01 of 18 February 2011 by the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensijām" pārejas noteikumu 30.punkta 
atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91. un 109.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 22 
February, No.29 (4427). 
37 Paragraph 3.2 of the Concluding part of judgement in the case No. 2001-12-01 of 19 
March 2002 by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts 
pensijām" pārejas noteikumu 26. punkta atbilstību Satversmes 91. un 109. pantam”. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 20 March 2002, No. 44 (2619).  
Paragraph 7 of judgement in the case No. 2004-03-01 of 25 October 2004 by the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensijām" 30. panta 
piektās un sestās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 91. pantam”. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 26 October 2004, No.169 (3117). 
38 Ruling No. 1 Bvl 44, 48-92 of 15 October 1996 by the First Senate of the Constitutional 
Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 92.Band. Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1997, p.64–96 (p.87). Ruling No. 1 Bvl 9, 11, 12/00, 5/01, 
10/04 of 13 June 2006 by the First Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. 
Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 116.Band. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007, p. 96–135 (p. 132). 
39 „In die damit erforderliche grundrechtliche Bewertung fließen freilich die allgemeinen 
rechtstaatlichen Grundsätze des Vertrauensschutzes, der Rechtssicherheit, aber auch der 
Verhältnismäßigkeit (hier beschränkt auf den Gesichtspunkt der 
Vergangenheitsanknüpfung) in der Weise ein, wie dies allgemein bei der Auslegung und 




methodology to assess the immediate effect, the Constitutional Court of 
Germany has expressis verbis indicated that immediate effect shall be 
assessed on the basis not only of the legitimate expectations but also 
principle of proportionality. If the legal norm under analysis is unlawful 
because to the principles of legitimate expectations or proportionality, it 
might be recognized as illegitimate.40 
At the same time it shall be noted that assessment of legitimacy of 
legal norms passed with immediate effect, in light of the public interest and 
interest of addressees of legal norms through the principle of proportionality, 
has become the main doctrine in the German legal system. Understanding 
that it is necessary not only to balance interest of addressees of legal norms 
and public interests but also clarify whether legislator had a necessity to pass 
the legal regulation with an immediate effect was introduced in the German 
legal system only twenty years ago.41 It shall be also noted that, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Anwendung von Grundrechten im Hinblick auf die Fragen des materiellen Rechts 
geschieht.“ (Translation: “Assessment has been performed on basis of general principles of 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty, as well as proportionality (restricted assessing 
adjustments from the point of view of the relation to the past) in a way that it is usually 
performed in interpreting and applying material legal norms”). Ruling No. 2 BvL 2/83 of 14 
May 1986 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 72.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1987, p. 200–276 (p. 242). 
40 „Sie ist verfassungsrechtlich grundsätzlich zulässig [..]. Jedoch können sich aus dem 
Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes und dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip Grenzen der 
Zulässigkeit ergeben. Das ist dann der Fall, wenn die vom Gesetzgeber angeordnete unechte 
Rückwirkung zur Erreichung des Gesetzeszwecks nicht geeignet oder erforderlich ist oder 
wenn die Bestandsinteressen der Betroffenen die Veränderungsgründe des Gesetzgebers 
überwiegen.” (Translation: “Generally those (amendments – M.O.) are legitimate [..]. 
However, due to violation of principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality they 
might be recognized as inadmissible. This is in case the immediate effect prescribed by 
legislator has not been applied or necessary to reach the goal of amendments, or interests of 
addressees of legal norms are more important than the basis of the amendments to legal 
regulation.”). Ruling No. 2 BvR 9 /85 and 3/86 of 8 June 1988 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 78.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989, p. 249–
289 (p. 284). Ruling No. 1 Bvl 44, 48-92 of 15 October 1996 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 92.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1997, p. 64–96 
(p. 86). Ruling No. 1 BvR 3076/08 of 18 February 2009 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 122.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, p. 374–397 (p. 394). 
41 „Der Gesetzgeber muss aber, soweit er für künftige Rechtsfolgen an zurückliegende 
Sachverhalte anknüpft, dem verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen Vertrauensschutz in 
hinreichendem Maß Rechnung tragen. Die Interessen der Allgemeinheit, die mit der 
Regelung verfolgt werden, und das Vertrauen des Einzelnen auf die Fortgeltung der 
Rechtslage sind abzuwägen [..] Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit muss gewahrt sein.” 
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advantages of the method and contents that are methodologically correct, in 
practice the respective doctrine has been used comparatively inconsistently 
and superficially, mainly assessing public interest and interests of addressees 
of legal norms. More rarely, however, the alternative means are assessed, 
through which a less significant interference with the past would be possible. 
For example, analysing restrictions imposed upon rights of officials 
employed by educational institutions, the Constitutional Court of Germany 
has noted that due to political reasons the existing rights may be applied to 
the new conditions. Therefore it is possible to attribute the legal regulation to 
issues the realization of which has been commenced in the past – to the legal 
status of officials.42 Similarly in other disputes the Constitutional Court of 
Germany has concluded that, as a result of discretion of legislator, legal 
expectations of legal subjects are stated to comparatively narrow 
assessment.43 Moreover, the main problems of this legal method are related 
to a rather abstract and generally incomparable comparison of interests. For 
example, the Constitutional Court of Germany has noted that amendments to 
legal regulation with an immediate effect are necessary to ensure the stability 
of the country, to finance the reunification of Germany, the basis of which 
cannot be assessed neither in its terms not methodologically opposing it to 
reliance interests of addressees of legal norms.  
 
3.  Conditions that may impact legitimacy of legal norms passed with 
immediate effect 
Evaluation of legal norms with immediate effect acknowledge that 
only in rare cases trust upon retaining the existing regulation shall be placed 
above legislator’s interest to interfere with the past dimension.44 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                     
(Translation: “Legislator is obliged to comply with the principle of legitimate expectations, 
if legal consequences are attributed to actual issues completed or commencement of their 
realization has been commenced. It is necessary to assess general interests, why the legal 
regulation is adjusted and reliance of addressees of legal norms upon the regulation to be in 
effect further on. [..] Principle of proportionality shall be observed.”) 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 748, 753, 1738/05 of 7 July 2010 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 127.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2011, p. 61–
87 (p. 76–77). 
42 Ruling No. 2 BvR 19/82 of 10 April 1984 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional 
Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 67.Band. Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1985, p. 1–25 (p. 15). 
43 Ruling No. 1 Bvl 9, 11, 12/00, 5/01, 10/04 of 13 June 2006 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 116.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, p. 96–135 (p. 132). 
44 Ruling No. 2 BvL 2/66, 2BvR 326, 327, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345/69 of 9 March 1971 by 
the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 




for example, until 1987 only four legal norms passed with immediate effect 
were recognized illegitimate from the point of view by the Constitutional 
Court of Germany.45 Similarly, since 1987 only in several cases legal norms 
with immediate effect have been recognized as illegitimate.46 A similar 
concept is present also in the Latvian legal system. Therefore further in the 
article have been analysed the main conditions on basis of which the legal 
norms can be recognized illegitimate. Keeping in mind the aforementioned, 
following analysis creates not only theoretical but also practical 
understanding of admissibility of legal norms from the point of view of time. 
 
3.1. Passing legal norms with immediate effect impacting rights assigned 
by an individual act 
The key argument of the current case-law on basis of which it would 
be possible to recognize legal norms passed with immediate effect 
illegitimate is existence of an individual legislative act.47 Namely, regardless 
of condition, whether public legal relations have been established by the 
administrative act, for example, providing social support benefit, or relations 
of private law nature, for example, there has been a loan agreement 
concluded between the parties, in all the cases addressees of legal norms may 
have a reasonable reliance upon retaining the legal regulation. In other 
words, in cases when addressees of legal norms have already been provided 
with a privilege, legal norms ensuring the privilege shall be respected with a 
larger degree of protection.48  
For example, in the case No. 2009-86-01 adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Court of Latvia that was assessing the amendments reducing 
pensions for public prosecutors, however, not only due to lack of transitional 
provisions and immediate coming into force but also due to recognition of an 
individual legislative act is concluded that cut of pension with an immediate 
effect is considered illegitimate from the point of view of time.49 As the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 30.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971, p. 250–
272 (p. 268). 
45 Aschke M. Übergangsregelungen als verfassungsrechtliches Problem. Frankfurt am Main: 
Verlag Peter Lang, 1987, p. 258. 
46 See, for example, ruling No. 2 BvR 748, 753, 1738/05 of 7 July 2010 by the Second 
Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 127.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2011, p.61–
87 (p.76). 
47 Türk A. Judicial Review in EU Law. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2009, p.130. 
48 Cited by: Stötzel M. Vertrauensschutz und Gesetzesrückwirkung. Grundtypen abgeleitet 
aus der Rückwirkungsrechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2002, p.57. 
49 Judgement in the case No. 2009-86-01 of 21 April 2010 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia ”Par Prokuroru izdienas pensiju likuma pārejas noteikumu 8.punkta 
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public prosecutors’ pensions have been already granted when the 
administrative act prescribing the amount of the pension, application of the 
legal norms to the granted pensions in this case was not admissible. Similar 
judgements by the Constitutional Court of Latvia have been passed in several 
other cases, assessing legitimacy of cut of pensions or other continued legal 
relations. One of the disputes adjudicated by the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia was the case No. 2009-43-01 prescribing that cut of regular pensions 
with an immediate effect is illegitimate due to lack of transitional provisions 
and assessment of alternative restrictions.50 Based upon the arguments 
referred to above, amendments to legal regulation of the law On Service 
Pensions for Ministry of the Interior System Employees with Special Service 
Ranks have been recognized illegitimate.51  
Not only recognizing administrative acts but also individual 
contractual relations can be considered as a significant argument to recognize 
legal norms passed with immediate effect illegitimate. If a person during the 
period of concluding contractual relations has relied upon the certain legal 
regulation to be effective also when regulating further legal relations, passing 
new legal norms in order to change the commenced legal relations may serve 
as one of the main arguments to restrict the legal norms passed with 
immediate effect. 
However, unlike the understanding of the law in the 19th century, 
when continued contractual relations were fully protected, nowadays there is 
no such large protection against interference with contractual relations.52 As 
of the beginning of the 20th century, a larger understanding of impacting 
contractual relations has been developed, prescribing that state cannot ensure 
protection to persons who have established contractual relations against the 
                                                                                                                                                     
atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91. un 109.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 23 
April 2010, No.65 (4257) 
50 Judgement in the case no. 2009-43-01 of 21 December 2009 by the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensiju un valsts pabalstu izmaksu laika 
periodā no 2009.gada līdz 2012.gadam" 2. panta pirmās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 1. un 109. pantam un 3. panta pirmās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 1., 91., 105. un 109. pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 22 December 2009, No.201 
(4187). 
51 Judgement in the case No. 2009-76-01 of 31 March 2010 by the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par izdienas pensijām Iekšlietu ministrijas sistēmas 
darbiniekiem ar speciālajām dienesta pakāpēm" pārejas noteikumu 20.punkta atbilstību 
Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 109.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 6 April 2010, No.54 
(4246). 
52 Hellman H., Pfeiffer K. Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der rückwirkenden 
Fusionskontrolle. Beiträge zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Festschrift für Heinz Kaufmann zum 65. 
Geburtstag. Köln-Marienburg, 1972, S.198. 




market laws53 that, in certain conditions, require amending legal regulation 
to protect the existing interests. For example, as regards changes in 
contractual relations, the legal doctrine indicates that persons who, according 
to the current legal regulation, are engaged in business activities and make 
decisions related thereto, take risk that laws passed afterwards and affect 
economics in any direction may inconvenience the plans of business or 
completely terminate the further activities.54 Therefore, if norms of the 
private law impacting contracts concluded in relation to future and there are 
no significant public interest in implementing amendments to the respective 
legal regulation, amendments passed with immediate effect may be 
considered legitimate.55  
However, recognizing that contractual relations impacted by the 
immediate effect, it should be at first assessed what consequences have been 
caused by the legal norm passed with immediate effect. For example, the 
legal doctrine differentiates between several aspects that might be impacted 
within the contractual relations: (1) amendments may terminate their 
activities; (2) contractual terms may be changed conceptually, including, 
change or restriction of fulfilment of a contract, or (3) prohibiting the 
fulfilment of undertakings.56 Therefore, clarifying admissibility of legal 
norms from the point of view of time, in each individual case it should be 
assessed whether and to what extent contractual relations have been 
impacted by the amendments to legal regulation with immediate effect, as 
well as what consequences it may cause as regards the joint economic 
stability. Moreover, reliance of subjects of a contract should be especially 
protected if the state prior to concluding contracts and undertaking liabilities 





                                                          
53 Götz V. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vertrauensschutz. Bundesverfassungsgericht und 
Grundgesetz. Festgabe aus Anlaß des 25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 
Zweiter Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1976, p.421–453. 
54 Klußmann M. Zulässigkeit und Grenzen von nachträglichen Eingriffen des Gesetzgebers 
in laufende Verträge. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970, p.122. 
55 See, for example, annotation of 20 December 2006 No. 16/3945 to the law On reforming 
the insurance contracts (“Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des 
Versicherungsvertragsrechts”).  
Available: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/039/1603945.pdf [accessed on 10 April 
2013] 
56 Klußmann M. Zulässigkeit und Grenzen von nachträglichen Eingriffen des Gesetzgebers 
in laufende Verträge. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970, p.42. 
57 Ibid., p.140. 
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3.2. Passing legal norms with immediate effect in the sphere of tax law 
Another circumstance that might significantly impact legitimacy of 
legal norms passed with immediate effect is related to amendments made in 
the sphere of tax law. As of the 1960s, identification of immediate effect in 
the German legal system was related to principle of tax period (in German – 
das Veranlagungszeitraum). Legal norms passed within the sphere of tax law 
are considered to be retroactive if those come into effect after the end of the 
calendar year and imposes tax to transactions performed during the previous 
calendar year.58 Therefore, if a legal norm comes into effect on 1 January or 
later and regulates transactions performed in the period as of 1 January to 31 
December of the previous year, the legal norm has impacted completed legal 
relations. However, if identical legal regulation relating to the whole 
calendar year has come into effect on 31 December, legal norm is not 
impacting a completed legal conditions and therefore it has an immediate 
effect. An identical approach has been implemented in the French legal 
doctrine where there is an understanding of a year as a unified tax period.59  
In light of the above, legal norms passed with immediate effect in the 
tax law have been more frequently recognized as illegitimate. For example, 
in ruling of 7 July 2010 the Constitutional Court of Germany has concluded 
that amendments to the Law on Income Tax (in German – 
Einkommensteuergesetz) passed with immediate effect have violated the 
principle of legitimate expectations and therefore can be partially recognized 
illegitimate.60 Although, to ensure the common good, legislator’s actions 
cannot be paralysed, interests of addressees of legal norms cannot be 
exposed to uncontrolled impact. Consequently cancellation of income tax 
compensations is illegitimate in cases when income tax-payers prior to the 
legal regulation coming into force have complied with all the preconditions 
necessary to receive the prescribed compensations but their rights were 
affected by the immediate effect. In addition, the last case when the 
Constitutional Court of Germany has recognised legal norms passed with 
immediate effect illegitimate was on 10 October 2012, when the court 
identified an illegitimate legal norm in the Law on Profit Tax (in German - 
                                                          
58 Vogel K. Rückwirkung: eine festgefahrene Diskussion, Ein Versuch die Blokade zu lösen, 
in Festschrift für Martin Heckel. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999, p.875–884. 
59 See, for example: Schloßmacher S. Die systemtragenden Prinzipien des französischen und 
belgischen Steuerrechts im Vergleich mit den systemtragenden Prinzipien des deutschen 
Steuerrechts. Dissertation an der Universität zu Köln, p.18–20. 
60 Ruling No. 2 BvR 748, 753, 1738/05 of 7 July 2010 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 127.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2011, p. 61–
87 (p.76). 




Gewerbesteuergesetz).61 Arguments in the case under review was similar – 
although taxable operations were performed during the previous legal 
regulation, amendments to legal regulation were passed with immediate 
effect, which respectively impacted also these operations performed in the 
tax period. 
As already indentified, such understanding of immediate effect in tax 
law might be considered a favourable tendency in order to evaluate and 
admit inadmissibility of legal norms passed with immediate effect. However, 
a presumption may be expressed that legal norms passed with immediate 
effect in the sphere of tax law shall be recognized illegitimate not due to a 
general protection of interests of addressees of legal norms against the 
immediate effect but in order to separate methodological deficiencies in 
immediate and retroactive effect. Passing amendments to tax law in relation 
to income or profit tax, retroactive effect shall be recognized only if changes 
in tax regulation are attributable to taxable operations performed during the 
previous calendar year. Moreover, operations performed during the 
respective calendar year shall be considered as impacted by the immediate 
effect. Therefore, in the tax law, objectively there is a larger possibility that 
legal norms passed with immediate effect may violate legitimate 
expectations of addressees of legal norms. 
 
3.3. Significance of transitional period in assessment of legal norms 
passed with immediate effect  
It is important to understand that in certain cases legal norms with 
immediate effect may be recognized illegitimate as there is no transitional 
period prescribed. Namely, legal norms passed with immediate effect come 
into force immediately after they have been adopted, not providing 
addressees of legal norms to adopt their already realized activities to the new 
legal regulation. At the same time although prescribing transitional period is 
one of the ways to ensure legitimacy of legal norms passed with immediate 
effect, however, it cannot be considered as an obligatory conditions to pass a 
legal norm with immediate effect.62  
                                                          
61 Ruling No. 1 BvL 6/07 of 10 October 2012 by the First Senate of the Constitutional Court 
of Germany. Available (not published in the collection of rulings): 
 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ls20121010_1bvl000607.html 
[accessed on 15 August 2013] 
62 „Das aus dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip abgeleitete Gebot des Vertrauensschutzes [..] ist durch 
das Fehlen von Übergangsvorschriften für den prüfungsfreien Zugang ebenfalls nicht 
beeinträchtigt.” (Translation: “Principle of legitimate expectations derived from the 
principle of the state of law is not impacted by the fact that no transitional period has been 
prescribed.”) Ruling No. 1 BvR 228, 311/73 of 18 November 1980 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
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By reference to case-law of the Constitutional Court of Germany, the 
Constitutional Court of Latvia has noted that “the principle of legal 
legitimate expectations cannot be interpreted in such a broad manner that 
would protect a person from any disappointment. In certain cases, when 
balancing the amount of the restriction of legitimate expectations and the 
necessity and urgency of amendments to legal regulation, deviation from the 
rights guaranteed to a person is permissible without providing a transitional 
period.”63 As the rights of legislator to pass norms with immediate effect, the 
necessity to provide an appropriate transitional regulation result from the 
principle of proportionality64 and principle of legitimate expectations.65 
Consequently it is of a special importance to pass transitional regulations in 
cases when the legal regulation has been effective for a long time and on 
basis of which inhabitants have planned and implemented their operations.66 
In relation to the above, firstly, it has to be noted that existence or 
lack of transitional provisions does not change the will and action of 
legislator passing legal norms with immediate effect. Transitional period 
actually only hinders the commencement of the legal regulation coming into 
force. Therefore, assessing legitimacy of legal norms passed with immediate 
effect appropriately and correctly, necessity to provide transitional period 
would be assessed only when it has been clarified that legal norms passed 
                                                                                                                                                     
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 55.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1980, p.185–
204 (p.203). 
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November 2009, No.187 (4173).  
64 Ruling No. 2 BvR 9/85 and 3/86 of 8 June 1988 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 78.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989, p.249–
289 (p.285). 
65 The existence and scope of transitional regulations depend on the interests of legal 
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with immediate effect are legitimate. Namely, if only legal norms passed 
with immediate effect do not impact the legitimate expectations of the 
addressees of legal norms so materially that those are recognized 
illegitimate, afterwards it shall be assessed whether implementation of such 
regulation without a transitional period or with insufficient transitional 
period complies with the interests of addressees of legal norms. At the same 
time, in cases when legal norms have been recognized illegitimate assessing 
a particular impact of immediate effect, analysis of legitimacy of transitional 
provisions is not necessary anymore. 
Therefore, the main function of transitional provisions is to protect 
interests of addressees of legal norms in case if they might face insufficient 
legitimate expectations that amendments to legal regulation passed with 
immediate effect may be recognized illegitimate per se. In addition, the 
Constitutional Court of Germany has noted that regardless of the fact that 
interference to the past with an immediate effect generally is legitimate, the 
principle of proportionality prescribes the responsibility to ensure that an 
appropriate and adequate transitional period is provide.67 Therefore, although 
not providing a transitional period is not an compulsory condition violating 
the legitimate expectations it is one of the aspects assessing whether it was 




1. In contrast to the nowadays used division of legal norms in three 
categories by their temporal binding nature, until the second half of the 20th 
century, i.e., the period after World War II, all legal norms were divided only 
in two groups. On the one hand, legal norms with binding nature that impacts 
completed legal relations or the realization of which was commenced in the 
past, i.e. retroactive and with immediate effect, were together separated. On 
the other hand, legal norms impacting the legal relations arising after the 
legal norms have been passed, were separated. Moreover, all legal norms in 
any way related to regulating issues completed in the past – both regarding 
the legal relations completed and those passed with immediate effect – where 
jointly referred to as “retroactive effect”.  
2. After World War II establishing new understanding of 
retroactivity, the primary goal was not to identify, whether legal norms 
                                                          
67 Ruling No. 1 BvR 79, 278, 282/70 of 8 February 1977 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 43.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1977, p.242–
291 (p.288). See also ruling No. 2 BvR 19/82 of 10 April 1984 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 67.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985, p.1–25 (p.15). 
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passed with immediate effect are lawful, but to clear whether legal norms 
related to the past do not impact completed legal relations and have not been 
passed with retroactive effect and therefore are considered illegitimate from 
the point of view of time. On the basis of the above understanding, from the 
very beginning legal norms passed with immediate effect were recognized as 
generally admissible. Moreover, initially the aforementioned position was 
not analysed more largely. Only later methodology was developed to clarify 
whether in each separate case legal norms passed with immediate effect have 
not illegitimately violated the rights of addressees of legal norms to 
legitimate expectations.  
3. Evaluating admissibility of legal norms passed with immediate 
effect, there shall be considered whether eventual breach of legitimate 
expectations of the addressees of legal norms is identified. Whether the legal 
norms passed with immediate effect are legitimate and lawful can be verified 
by assessing the mutual interest of addressees of legal norms and that of the 
public. Several methods have been developed in the case-law to assess the 
balancing of interests of addressees of legal norms and the public interest. 
One of the most effective methods in assessing admissibility of legal norms 
passed with immediate effect is usage of the traditional proportionality test, 
clarifying whether legal norm is proportional from the point of view of time. 
4. As one of the main arguments on the basis of which legitimate 
expectations of addressees of legal norms might be affected, is recognition of 
an individual legislative act, according to which the imposed rights are 
impacted by the immediate effect. In addition, because of the wide 
understanding of immediate effect in the tax law sphere, there is a higher 
possibility that legal norms shall be recognized illegitimate. Finally, not 
providing appropriate transitional period may serve as a basis to recognize 




Case No. 2012-21-01 of 12 June 2013 by the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
„Par 2009. gada 12. marta likuma "Grozījumi Iekšlietu ministrijas sistēmas 
iestāžu un Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvaldes amatpersonu ar speciālajām dienesta 
pakāpēm dienesta gaitas likumā" 5.panta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 1. un 91.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 14 June 2013, No.114 
(4920).  
Case No. 2011-04-01 of  22 November 2011 by the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia „Par Maksātnespējas likuma 13.panta pirmās daļas 2.punkta, ciktāl tas 
attiecas uz personām, kuras savu darbību maksātnespējas procesa 
administratora amatā ir uzsākušas saskaņā ar likuma "Par uzņēmumu un 
uzņēmējsabiedrību maksātnespēju" 13.panta prasību par augstāko izglītību 




ekonomikas, vadības vai finanšu jomā, un Maksātnespējas likuma pārejas 
noteikumu 7.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91. un 
106.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 24 November 2011, No.185 (4583). 
Case No. 2010-60-01 of 30 March 2011 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia „Par Kredītiestāžu likuma 59.2panta, 59.3panta, 59.4 
panta, 117.panta ceturtās daļas 3.punkta, 173.panta ceturtās daļas un 
185.panta pirmās prim daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 
90., 91., 92. un 105.pantam“. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 31 March 2011, No.51 
(4449). 
Case No. 2010-29-01 of 18 February 2011 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensijām" pārejas noteikumu 
30.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91. un 109.pantam”. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 22 February, No.29 (4427). 
Case No. 2010-02-01 of 19 June 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
"Par likuma "Par nodokļiem un nodevām" 16.panta 10.punkta atbilstību 
Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 105.pantam". Latvijas Vēstnesis, 28 
June 2010, No.100 (4292).  
Case No. 2009-86-01 of  21 April 2010 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia ”Par Prokuroru izdienas pensiju likuma pārejas 
noteikumu 8.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91. un 
109.pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 23 April 2010, No.65 (4257). 
Case No. 2009-76-01 of 31 March 2010 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par izdienas pensijām Iekšlietu ministrijas 
sistēmas darbiniekiem ar speciālajām dienesta pakāpēm" pārejas noteikumu 
20.punkta atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 109.pantam”. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 6 April 2010, No.54 (4246). 
Case No. 2009-43-01 of 21 December 2009 by the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensiju un valsts pabalstu 
izmaksu laika periodā no 2009.gada līdz 2012.gadam" 2. panta pirmās daļas 
atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 109. pantam un 3. panta 
pirmās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1., 91., 105. un 109. 
pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 22 December 2009, No.201 (4187). 
Case No. 2009-08-01 of  26 November 2009 by the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Latvia „Par 2009.gada 12.marta likuma "Grozījumi likumā 
"Par valsts pensijām" 2.panta vārdu "valsts pensijas 2009.gadā pārskatītas 
netiek" atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 109.pantam“. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 27 November 2009, No.187 (4173). 
Case No. 2004-03-01 of 25 October 2004 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensijām" 30. panta piektās un 
sestās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 91. pantam”. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 26 October 2004, No.169 (3117). 
European Scientific Journal   October 2013  edition vol.9, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
50 
 
Case No. 2001-12-01 of 19 March 2002 by the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia „Par likuma "Par valsts pensijām" pārejas noteikumu 26. 
punkta atbilstību Satversmes 91. un 109. pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 20 
March 2002, No. 44 (2619).  
Ruling No. 1 BvL 6/07 of 10 October 2012 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Not published, available: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ls20121010_1bvl0
00607.html [accessed on 15 August 2013]. 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 748, 753, 1738/05 of 7 July 2010 by the Second Senate of 
the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 127.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 2011, p.61–87. 
Ruling No. 1 BvR 3076/08 of 18 February 2009 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 122.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, p. 
374–397.  
Ruling No. 1 Bvl 9, 11, 12/00, 5/01, 10/04 of 13 June 2006 by the First 
Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 116.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, 
p. 96–135. 
Ruling No. 1 Bvl 44, 48-92 of 15 October 1996 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 92.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1997, p. 64–96 . 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 9 /85 and 3/86 of 8 June 1988 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 78.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1989, p. 249–289. 
Ruling No. 2 BvL 2/83 of 14 May 1986 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 72.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1987, p. 200–276. 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 19/82 of 10 April 1984 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 67.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985, p. 1–
25. 
Ruling No. 23, 2 BvR 475/78 of 22 March 1983 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 63.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1983, p. 343–380. 
Ruling No. 1 BvR 228, 311/73 of 18 November 1980 by the First Senate of 
the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 




Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 55.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1980, p. 185–204. 
Ruling No. 1 BvR 79, 278, 282/70 of 8 February 1977 by the First Senate of 
the Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 43.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1977, p. 242–291. 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 17/69 of 23 March 1971 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 30.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1971, p. 392–406. 
Ruling No. 2 BvL 2/66, 2BvR 326, 327, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345/69 of 9 
March 1971 by the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Germany. 
Published: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 30.Band. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971, p. 250–272. 
Ruling No. 1 BvR 7/62 of 16 October 1968 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 24.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969, p.220–
235. 
Ruling No. 1 Bvl 22/57 of 11 October 1962 by the First Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 14.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1963, p. 288–306. 
 Ruling No. 2 BvR 1/60 of 19 December 1961 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 13.Band. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1963, p. 
274–278. 
Ruling No. 2 BvR 4/59 of 31 May 1960 by the Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany. Published: Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 11.Band. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1961, p. 139–149. 
 
Literature: 
Aschke M. Übergangsregelungen als verfassungsrechtliches Problem. 
Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1987. 
Berger T. Zulässigkeitsgrenzen der Rückwirkung von Gesetzen. Eine 
kritische Analyse der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und 
des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Frankfurt am Main: 
Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2002. 
Götz V. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vertrauensschutz. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht und Grundgesetz. Festgabe aus Anlaß des 
25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Zweiter Band. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1976. 
European Scientific Journal   October 2013  edition vol.9, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
52 
 
Hellman H., Pfeiffer K. Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der rückwirkenden 
Fusionskontrolle. Beiträge zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Festschrift für Heinz 
Kaufmann zum 65. Geburtstag. Köln-Marienburg, 1972. 
Hess B. Intertemporales Privatrecht. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998. 
Heukels T. Die Rückwirkungsjudikatur des EuGH: Grundlagen und 
Tendenzen. Vortrag vor dem Europainstitut der Universität des Saarlandes 
Saarbrücken, den 15. Januar, 1992. Europa-Institut Universität des 
Saarlandes, 1992. 
Heukels T. Intertemporales Gemeinschaftsrecht. Rückwirkung, 
Sofortwirkung und Rechtsschutz in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990. 
Juratowitch B. Retroactivity and the Common Law. Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2008. 
Klußmann M. Zulässigkeit und Grenzen von nachträglichen Eingriffen des 
Gesetzgebers in laufende Verträge. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970. 
Krons M. Intertemporālo tiesību mācība un Civillikuma trešais pants. 
Tieslietu Ministrijas Vēstnesis, 1938, No.1. p. 83-115.  
Maurer H. Kontinuitätsgewähr und Vertrauensschutz. Ins: Isensee J., 
Kirchhof P. Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band IV. Heidelberg: C.F.Müller 
Verlag, 2006. 
Maurer H. Staatsrecht. München: C.H. Beck´sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1999. 
Muckel S. Kriterien des verfassungsrechtlichen Vertrauensschutzes bei 
Gesetzesänderungen. Berlin: Duncer & Humblot, 1989, 
Neuhaus K.J., Kloth A., Köther L. Neue Frist, alte Verträge – Wann ist ein 
Altvertrag mit mehrjähriger Laufzeit kündbar. Zeitschrift für 
Versicherungswesen, 15.03.2009. 
Onževs M. Retroactivity of legal norms and its restriction in a state of law. 
Sciences of Law for Future, 2. Journal of the University of Latvia, No. 4, 
2013. 
Onževs M. Par neīsta atpakaļejoša spēka izpratni Latvijas tiesu nolēmumos. 
Jurista Vārds, 26 March 2013, No. 12 (763). 
Pieroth B. Rückwirkung und Übergangsrecht Verfassungsrechtiche 
Massstäbe für intertemporale Gesetzgebung. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 
1981. 
Schloßmacher S. Die systemtragenden Prinzipien des französischen und 
belgischen Steuerrechts im Vergleich mit den systemtragenden Prinzipien 
des deutschen Steuerrechts. Dissertation an der Universität zu Köln. 
Schmidt W. „Vertrauensschutz” im öffentlichen Recht. Randpositionen des 
Eigentums im spätbürgerlichen Rechtsstaat. Juristische Schulung, September 
1973, Heft 9, p.529–537. 




Stötzel M. Vertrauensschutz und Gesetzesrückwirkung. Grundtypen 
abgeleitet aus der Rückwirkungsrechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Europäischer 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2002. 
Türk A. Judicial Review in EU Law. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2009. 
Vogel K. Rückwirkung: eine festgefahrene Diskussion, Ein Versuch die 
Blokade zu lösen, in Festschrift für Martin Heckel. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1999. 
Vonkilch A. Das Intertemporale Privatrecht. Übergangsfragen bei Gesetzes- 
und Rechtsprechungsänderungen im Privatrecht. Wien: Springer Verlag, 
1999. 
 
Legal acts and additional materials 
Amendments to the Civil Law of 20 June 2013. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 4 July 
2013, No. 128 (4934). 
Report on first impact assessment of the draft law “Amendments to the Civil 
Procedure Law” (annotation).  
Available: 
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS10/SaeimaLIVS10.nsf/0/7264CFBB80090237C
225783E00314570?OpenDocument#b. [accessed on 10 August 2013]. 
Annotation of 20 December 2006 No. 16/3945 to the law On Reforming the 
Insurance Contracts (“Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des 
Versicherungsvertragsrechts”).  
Available: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/039/1603945.pdf 
[accessed on 10 April 2013]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
